Health economic value of an innovation: delimiting the scope and framework of future market entry agreements
Background and objectives: The objective of our paper is to offer a new, payer-friendly taxonomy of market entry agreements (MEAs) that aims to twin contracts with their methodological designs in an effort to clarify the distinction between contracts that are based on performance and those that are based on demonstrated effect.
Methods: Our analysis proceeds in two stages: First, we delimit the scope and framework of pay for performance (P4P) and pay for demonstrated effect (P4E) agreements. Second, we distinguish the methodological designs supporting the implementation of each of these contracts.
Results: We elucidate why P4P contracts prevent the payer from funding the true effectiveness of an innovation by expanding on their limitations. These include: 1) the normative nature of comparisons, 2) the impossibility of true effect imputability for each individual, and 3) the use of intermediary outcome measures. We then explore three main criticisms that payers must take into account when reasoning in terms of performance rather than in terms of the product effectiveness.
Conclusion: The potential effect that performance-based reimbursements may have on dissociating the components of the cost-effectiveness ratio constitutes an obstacle to a true health economic reasoning.
Launois, R., Navarrete, L. F., Ethgen, O., Le Moine, J-G., & Gatsinga, R. (2014). Health economic value of an innovation: delimiting the scope and framework of future market entry agreements. Journal of Market Access & Health Policy, 2, 24988. DOI: 10.3402/jmahp.v2.24988