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  • The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Sitting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Sitting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

Mansfield, C., Van Houtven, G., & Huber, J. (2001). The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Sitting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters? Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 22(2/3), 141 - 162.

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