### THE JOURNAL OF NIC’S LARGE JAIL NETWORK

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Foreword

This issue of the LJN Exchange includes a variety of articles on topics that have not been addressed at recent Network meetings. Jail privatization, substance abuse recovery programming, planning for jail emergencies, homelessness and health care for veterans in jail, and performance evaluations are topics that have drawn a great deal of interest from the field. In addition, the difficulty of making the transition from operating a prison to administering a large urban jail remains an important issue for discussion. It is our belief that these articles will be not only interesting to readers but also useful additions to information you may previously have acquired on these topics.

The mission of the Large Jail Network—which has grown in membership to 174 systems—continues to be to promote the exchange of ideas and innovations among the largest jails and jails systems in the U.S. We recognize that the persons who make up our constituent group of sheriffs, jail administrators, directors of corrections, wardens, chief jailers, superintendents, and administrators by other titles has changed dramatically in recent years. Therefore, we continue:

- To actively seek participation of jail systems that have a great deal to offer but that have not been involved with the Network;
- To assist administrators who are new to their role and new to the Network;
- To seek new and creative ways to identify and meet the needs of the Network and its members; and
- To identify and increase opportunities to open the Network and our meetings to persons and broader issues that relate to the administration and operation of large jails.

Both the LJN Exchange and Network meetings reflect the Institute's belief that large jail systems collectively possess the expertise to meet most challenges any single jurisdiction might face. NIC neither evaluates nor endorses the articles presented here; our role is to provide the vehicle for a free and open exchange of ideas and information. Articles contributed by network agencies and others demonstrate a commitment to communicating the jail's role as an effective and major component of the local criminal justice system.

The success of both the LJN Exchange and the Network continues to depend on the involvement of large jail systems’ administrators. We invite LJN members to continue to use this and other NIC services, and more importantly, to inform us as to how we might meet other needs that have not been addressed.

Richard Geaither  
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An Innovative Approach to Jail Emergencies

Your jail has a fire in the kitchen, and the building is filling with smoke. You have to evacuate all staff and inmates. Are you ready? Do you know where your evacuation site is? What about perimeter points and emergency contact numbers?

Would it help you manage this emergency if you had these things, along with aerial photos and floor plans, right at your fingertips? If so, you need a program such as the Jail Emergency Management System (JEMS), which was designed and developed by Sheriff Ken Jenne and the Broward Sheriff's Office Department of Detention.

“Emergency preparedness” is a catch phrase used across the nation among federal, state, and local authorities, and more recently, private citizens. Whether the event is terrorist-related, accidental, or natural, the topic of emergency planning and preparedness has dominated news, seminars, and board meetings since the turn of the century. But are we really prepared? With each major event, agencies learn lessons from both unforeseeable situations and those that might have been prevented. It doesn’t matter whether the lessons come from flood waters, power outages, catastrophic damage, poor communication, unrealistic or incomplete response plans, or disorganized responses; each situation offers educational scenarios for every agency that is commissioned to respond.

In the corrections field, every jail administrator needs to be prepared for an emergency. Not only is the jail responsible for preserving public safety by maintaining custody and control of inmates, but jails are also obligated to provide every individual in our custody with essential life services and life-saving protection. Too often, those involved in emergency planning in correctional institutions focus on internal resources and assume that all jail staff are thoroughly familiar with evacuation plans, fire suppression, emergency containment of prisoners, facility security procedures, and each individual’s responsibility in an emergency. This may be a correct assumption for individuals who work within the jail, but
what happens when an event occurs that goes beyond the ability of the facility’s internal resources?

The Broward Sheriff’s Office’s Department of Detention did not wait for an emergency to find out the answer to this question. In 2004, the Department of Detention, headed by Sheriff Ken Jenne, began developing emergency contingency plans and holding disaster drills to better prepare detention officials, local law enforcement agencies, and other emergency responders for crisis situations. This was no small task.

The Broward Sheriff’s Office is the nation’s largest fully accredited public safety sheriff’s office, and it operates the country’s twelfth largest jail system. With an average daily population of 5,400 inmates, the agency manages five separate detention facilities: one maximum custody high-rise facility; one minimum custody campus-style facility; one mental health and medical campus-style facility; and two “new generation” direct supervision facilities. Employing 1,559 sworn correctional officers and 389 civilian support staff, the Department of Detention annually admits approximately 75,000 new arrestees and transports more than 160,000 inmates between the five facilities and throughout the state. To serve this entire system, the department developed the unique and innovative JEMS program as a part of its emergency planning initiative.

**An Innovative System**
The JEMS program is the first of its kind for correctional institutions. It is a computer-based, emergency response tool that combines facility design intelligence, pre-planned emergency procedures, strategically planned response positioning, satellite and aerial photos of the facility, resource contacts, and other information deemed essential for an efficient, measured response. The program merges these crucial pieces of information onto one disc for virtually no expense, and it ensures that this comprehensive information is readily available at the click of a mouse and accessible at nearly any location.

**How does JEMS work?** JEMS is a web-based computer program that is designed with a simple, user-friendly, interactive design. It is a pioneering tool that allows detention officials in the Broward Sheriff’s Office to strategize and plan, in advance, responses to hostage situations, riots, escapes, facility fires, terrorist-related attacks, natural disasters, and other unusual occurrences and emergency situations. Although the program is not a solution to every emergency response, it is a resource that enables the user to make rational, clear decisions on life safety issues and evaluate a situation while under extreme duress.

In creating this program, the Department of Detention conducted tabletop disaster drills in each of its detention facilities. From these drills, the department gathered intelligence on what staff already knew and how well the department was prepared to respond—in terms of equipment, knowledge, individual and contract service provider responsibilities, and the effectiveness of procedures. The agency also gathered information on the strengths and weaknesses of each facility’s design and external and internal threats to the facility, including access to fuel supplies and power supplies and the potential threats posed by surrounding buildings to facility security. In addition, the department looked at the layout of each facility to determine obstructions that would impede tactical entry or
evacuations. Finally, the planners gained an understanding of what is expected from external emergency agencies responding to the facility in a disaster situation, and they then met with local fire departments, HAZMAT teams, law enforcement, and emergency medical responders to come to a mutual understanding of each agency’s responsibilities.

The easiest way to illustrate the JEMS program’s usefulness is to describe it through the following scenario:

At 2240 hours, an acting shift commander at the rank of sergeant is confronted with an escape attempt via vehicle intrusion through a perimeter fence and dormitory building. Two correctional officers are taken hostage and held in one area of the housing unit by 21 inmates. Six other inmates have fled the compound on foot. The highest-ranking officer is the sergeant left to oversee the operation.

The sergeant must make vital decisions to contain the situation to the smallest area possible. Immediately, primary and secondary perimeters need to be established to prevent further intrusion and to stop the fleeing inmates. He needs to protect the life and safety of the staff and inmates in the affected and surrounding areas. He has to know how to evacuate and account for all non-essential staff. He needs to obtain and disseminate information about the affected housing area (e.g., type of population, facility design, entry and exit routes of the area, and number of staff held hostage). In addition, he must know which emergency agency personnel and jail staff to summon for assistance and how to contact them. These crucial decisions and many more must be made in a matter of minutes while under immense pressure.

Enabling a rapid response. Since the most critical time for containing most incidents is within the first 20 minutes, the correct decisions about who, what, where, when, and how to respond must be made immediately. With JEMS, this information is readily available. Furthermore, the information in the program has been compiled with assistance from all commands and during a time when critical thinking is clearest—before an incident occurs. JEMS provides logistical information without making an officer search through directories, manuals, call-out lists, or filing cabinets—all with a mind that is significantly pressured by the event itself. The program is available from any computer station within the facility or remotely from laptops in mobile perimeter units.

The JEMS program would aid a response to the above scenario as follows:

- Because the program compiles all relevant information about a facility together in a web page design, the sergeant can activate the program by calling a central dispatch communications center. The communication center’s staff can immediately begin establishing the predetermined perimeter points (primary and secondary) by dispatching law enforcement patrols from the surrounding area to assist in containing the incident quickly.

- The dispatch center can then assist in notifying emergency response agencies and commanders as outlined by the program.
As emergency response personnel arrive, the sergeant has at his disposal all evacuation plans, schematics or blueprints of the affected housing area, aerial photos of the facility, ground-level photos for entry and evacuation, and population data for review and use by SWAT teams, Emergency Response Teams, crowd control teams, fire departments, HAZMAT teams, and any other requesting agency.

As the facility is evacuated, non-essential employees can report to predetermined staging areas, while the media, families, and/or onlookers are directed to areas set up away from the crisis.

JEMS Features
The JEMS program helps facilitate the emergency responses of the Sheriff’s Office and all other agencies in the region. The main menu page of the program gives the user the ability to obtain lists of contacts (administration, after-hour emergency, and dispatch telephone numbers) for all law enforcement agencies, fire departments, hospitals, and federal emergency response agencies serving the Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach Counties. Additionally, the user can access the agency’s Unusual Occurrence Response Plan, Hurricane Response Plan, staffing rosters, links to each detention facility’s Command Center information pages, Mobile Command Center activation information, and established emergency contingency plans for the Department of Detention, including procedures for utility outages, mass arrests, evacuations, bomb threats, and fires.

From the main menu page, the user can access the opening web page of each Broward County detention facility. On each of these main facility pages, the user finds the following:

- Command center contact information;
- Facility administration contact information;
- Major roadways surrounding the facility;
- Primary and secondary perimeter staging areas; and
- Emergency contacts for local fire rescue.

The user can access aerial photos of each facility from every direction; these provide an overview of the facility’s layout and obstacles on the compound and roofs that may pose a threat to response personnel. Each aerial photo is provided in large and small JPEG (*.jpg) formats, with labeled buildings and roadways for easy reference.

Ground-level photos, which illustrate an eye-level view of entryways and roadways around the facility, give an idea of strategic surveillance points and obstacles that may hinder entry. Maps of the facility and surrounding city streets present a visual depiction of primary and secondary perimeter staging points; non-essential employee staging areas; media, family, and onlookers’ staging areas; and command center locations (primary, secondary, and tertiary).
The user can also access the emergency evacuation and contingency plans specific to the affected facility, as well as housing schema and the custody assignments of inmate populations that occupy each area. Finally, the user has access to contact information for the Department of Detention's Emergency Response Team (ERT).

Essentially, all the basic, pre-planned information relevant to emergency response procedures can be contained in a program like JEMS. JEMS was created on a desktop computer, using five basic computer programs: Microsoft Office, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft FrontPage 2000, Adobe Acrobat Writer, and a generic photo-editing program. With modest computer knowledge, anyone can generate a program similar to JEMS at little to no expense. The only cost, besides the manpower to organize and link the information, is the expense of obtaining the relevant information that most jail administrations already possess, such as aerial photos, blueprints, software, and contact information.

**JEMS Proves Its Usefulness**

JEMS demonstrated its value when Hurricane Wilma came ashore on October 24, 2005. Although the Broward Sheriff's Office Department of Detention did not experience devastation, wind and rain damage caused power and water supply failures in all Broward Sheriff's Office's facilities. During the storm, inmates in one part of a facility were evacuated to another part of the jail, and another facility required nearly a complete evacuation in the days following the storm's initial impact. Each evacuation was completed almost effortlessly. The main command center used the JEMS program during this weather event for its valuable information, especially the Department of Detention's hurricane contingency plan and emergency evacuation procedures.

The exercises and preliminary planning for the JEMS program proved beneficial to all participants. Although Hurricane Wilma was overwhelming to local communities, the Broward Department of Detention maintained its composure and executed its pre-planned emergency procedures methodically and professionally. Thanks to the JEMS program and the redevelopment of our emergency plans, this emergency was safely managed. With the JEMS program in place and proper advance preparation, future events, when encountered, can be dealt with just as effectively.

For a demonstration copy of the JEMS program or assistance in the development of a similar program, please feel free to contact the author.

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Annual Performance Evaluations in Corrections: An Outdated and Counterproductive Ritual?

Each year, corrections managers and supervisors are confronted with one of the most resource-draining and ineffective “fight evil, do good” assignments we can get: preparing and presenting annual employee performance evaluations.

We are all tasked with completing routine, well-intended, and necessary exercises, such as preparing and defending annual budgets and work plans; participating in operational, fiscal, and health & safety audits; and directing or overseeing obligatory personnel-related work, such as contract negotiations, employee discipline, and training, to name just a few. Nothing, however, is as universally dreaded as conducting annual performance reviews.

There are many reasons for this dread. One well-known management consultant, Dick Gorelick of Primedia Publication, has written for years that a poorly or perfunctorily conducted performance evaluation program is worse than no program at all. He argues that, too often, the outcome of an evaluation is increased acrimony and erosion of teamwork. This is a result of the fact that the focus is on ratings, many of which are assigned arbitrarily and without explanation. When this is the case, nobody feels good about the process or the results.

Ira S. Wolfe, founder of Success Performance Solutions and author of Understanding Business Values and Motivators (Atlanta, Georgia: CreativeCommunication Publications, 2004), lists 21 reasons why performance reviews fail. A few of these reasons follow.

- The reviewer and employees have a personal friendship and can’t differentiate that from their supervisor-employee role.

- Annual reviews are often based on most recent performance, not performance over the course of a year. Poor performance immediately prior to the rating period often dominates or eclipses the fine work done previously—or vice versa. (Think of how many times you have seen...
Academy Awards go to recently released movies, as opposed to those that opened early in the year.)

- Managers don’t believe in rating employees at the top of the scale, because “nobody is perfect, and there is always room for improvement.”

- There are inconsistent approaches to reviews and multiple standards; while one supervisor won’t rate anyone a “10,” another will rate an employee higher than he or she deserves, hoping to boost his or her confidence and subsequent performance. It is also difficult to assess staff in a consistent manner when they work different shifts, different assignments, and even at different facilities.

- Supervisors don’t differentiate between an employee’s personality and competence or effort and results. Consequently, employees who are friendly and “easier” to manage get better scores or rewards, even though they may be poor performers.

- The criteria for performance evaluation are not prioritized. Attendance and a positive attitude get the same weight as the quality and quantity of work or an outstanding safety record.

- Performance reviews are sprung on employees, giving them little or no time to prepare their thoughts or concerns, effectively compromising any chance they may have to offer thoughtful feedback or responses to challenges to improve.

- There are supervisors who say, “I really hate doing reviews, but HR says I have to, so let’s just get it over with.”

- Performance reviews are required to be completed annually, but the policy is not enforced. As a result, some employees feel singled out, particularly if they get a poor or critical review, while others feel ignored.

- Performance reviews are all about protecting the organization from litigation and complying with employment laws, rather than about evaluating employees to help them improve or to cultivate the department’s collective talent pool.

### Avoiding Litigation

As the final point above suggests, many experts argue that an annual performance evaluation is needed to document poor performance as a basis to defend terminations. My experience suggests otherwise. I have found that one of the largest obstacles to defending a rightful termination is the fact that an employee’s personnel file is packed with “genius certificates”—otherwise known as annual performance reviews.

These reviews, dutifully completed by sergeants and/or first-line supervisors, generally offer a sentence or two of relatively positive affirmations or scores— noting that the officer or staff member understands the organization’s policies and procedures, works well with others, is dependable, reports to work on time,
has successfully completed all required training, and is attentive to safety and security protocols. Almost without exception, every officer receives a “satisfactorily meets expectations” as an overall rating. And if he or she has more than 2 to 3 years of experience, the scoring or rating often “creeps up” to “exceeds expectations,” particularly if there has been the same rater over time.

These reviews are authored and signed by the sergeant or supervisor, forwarded to a lieutenant, captain, or command staff for review and sign-off, with copies going back to the officer and into his or her personnel file. If the employee’s performance remains steady or shows even modest improvement over the next year, his or her scores and overall ratings will either remain constant or continue to climb—even if he or she has displayed a less than appropriate attitude and/or experienced serious performance problems.

As a result, when an officer or other staff member is later terminated (or subject to suspension), the manager and organization are confronted with a demand to consider a set of well-documented “satisfactory” (or better) performance reviews as evidence against upholding the proposed discipline. How many times have you reviewed the file of an officer with a relatively well-known history of problem behavior or poor performance only to find a collection of commendations, training certificates, and a series of annual performance reviews all noting satisfactory or better performance?

The idea that annual performance reviews mitigate litigation risk is likely more theory than practice in most organizations. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that relief is on the way, unless you believe, as I do, that it is time to abolish the practice of annual evaluations once and for all.

On a Collision Course?
To be sure, there are legions of HR administrators continuing to exhort us all to attend prudently to annual performance reviews…and for good reason. After all, no one can legitimately argue that we should be completely indifferent to our obligation to review every employee’s performance and communicate our assessment to the employee. However, an argument can be made that the traditional model, which generally imposes upon us to do so once each year, is on an unavoidable collision course with the emerging reality and dynamics of many of today’s corrections departments and operations.

One of America’s most insightful pundits, comedian Woody Allen, once dryly observed the following, “More than any time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray that we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”2 This bleak perspective represents the two most likely approaches to annual performance reviews for many organizations. We either begrudgingly proceed to pump out relatively “vanilla” evaluations for all employees (generally at the last minute), or we elect to pass on the opportunity altogether.

Why do so many of us manufacture these faceless and redundant annual performance reviews? In part, because of the problems noted above, as well as our own silent belief that anyone with a 98.6 degree temperature gets a satisfactory rating. As a result, we don’t look to or use the performance review when
allocating pay increases, promotions, or even special assignments. Pay raises generally go up a step every year for all employees, both for outstanding performers and poor ones alike. (Fiscal constraints or HR policies often restrict the number of staff who may be eligible for merit pay of more than the obligatory one-step advancement.)

For the same reasons, annual reviews are often an afterthought when promoting officers to supervisory or special assignments. Instead, we rely on the results of tests and other more objective measures. Ironically, even the staff and their labor groups argue for civil service or internally managed exams, as opposed to annual reviews that “depend on who you know.”

These realities lead to even less time, energy, and thought going into annual performance reviews. It is a vicious cycle that, if not properly managed, can result in “dumbing down” or institutionalizing marginal performance as a cultural value in the organization. But many HR professionals and an increasing number of corrections practitioners are coming to the realization that a different model might be the answer.

An Alternative: Individual Recognition Plans
More and more managers and organizations have concluded that less formal reviews, done more frequently, will have better results. At the same time Gorelick has argued against annual ratings-focused reviews, he has called for organizations to move to a series of on-going “individual development plans,” which are done quarterly, if not more often. Instead of expeditiously completing forms of little value and with many downsides, why not focus on a customized and individualized feedback session?

These sessions could be held as often as monthly or weekly, over a cup of coffee. In just a few minutes you can offer an assessment of how an officer has handled a specific situation or responded to a new policy or expectation. The focus is wholly on employee development and work performance. Poor performance can (and should) continue to be documented for future reference, if necessary.

The point here is to adopt frequent review sessions as opposed to the once-a-year model of feedback. It is likely that marginal or poor performers will benefit far more from regular and routine feedback sessions, which in turn may reduce the chance of more serious disciplinary action being required later. Regular “heart-to-heart” sessions with employees promote a culture of openness and communication.

More frequent feedback sessions also ensure that problem employees know that they are not performing to management’s expectations much sooner than they would with an annual review, and this provides them an opportunity to correct the problem. At the same time, managers will become aware of talented but disenchanted or unhappy employees in time, perhaps, to prevent them from leaving or, worse yet, staying with an increasingly poor level of performance.
Moving Into the Future

The number of individuals in the U.S. who are members of organized labor groups is steadily declining. Today, less than 8% of America’s workforce is in a union. More and more Generation Xers and their colleagues are working in small firms, often with only two or three employees whose function is to collect and distribute data and information to customers worldwide. As a result, their evaluations and reviews will be more casual, frequent, and structured for two-way communication. The trend in performance reviews is therefore likely to continue to move away from the traditional annual assessment.

As Wolfe notes, “Despite the number of unemployed workers available and those willing to jump ship, the quality of the labor pool isn’t very good.” In the corrections field, the work today requires more knowledge and skills than ever before. Emerging technology calls for all employees to have a basic competence in the use of PCs, databases, touch screens, and new electronic tools to access inmate records, open doors, complete fingerprinting, conduct U/A’s, and perform numerous other daily tasks.

In his work, Wolfe notes that organizations will become “more dependent upon human capital to build value than ever before.” He explains that “as recently as 1982, 62% of the value in an organization was measured by its tangible assets. By 2002, nearly 80% of its value shifted to intangible assets. As a result, smart organizations seem to be interested in optimizing the way these precious assets are managed, and establishing an effective performance management system is an organization’s way of doing that.”

It is time for corrections supervisors to recognize this fact, as it is becoming increasingly difficult to retain good staff members, given the aging workforce and the difficulty in recruiting competent replacements. The Individualized Recognition Plan is an option that could improve employee retention, enhance internal communications, minimize liability risks, and provide your department with an increased ability to meet its safety and security objectives.

Notes
4. Ira Wolfe, ibid.
5. Ira Wolfe, ibid.
Incarcerated individuals represent a group with a high risk for homelessness (O’Flaherty, 1996). Released inmates may have few financial or social support resources. The stigma of a criminal record may also reduce their employability and ability to secure housing. Many incarcerated individuals suffer from mental health and substance abuse issues. These problems may hamper their ability to remain self-sufficient in the community.

In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System (VA GLAHS) partnered with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) to provide assessment and pre-release planning for inmates in the downtown Los Angeles County Jail who were veterans. The hope was that, after leaving the jail, veterans would immediately start receiving VA care, including transitional housing, health care, mental health treatment, and vocational rehabilitation.

This article discusses the role of VA social work leaders in developing the jail outreach program. The authors use elements of Hasenfeld and Brock’s Political Economy Model (1991) to examine how the team took advantage of many fortunate political circumstances to overcome barriers associated with large institutions attempting to collaborate and innovate. The positive experience of VA GLAHS and Los Angeles County may serve as a model for other communities dealing with the problem of homelessness among released inmates.

**Historical Perspective**

The daily census of the Los Angeles County Jail system is approximately 22,000 inmates (Leonard, 2004), of which an estimated 10%, or 2,200 individuals, are veterans (U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). A study of veterans in the Los Angeles jail (McGuire, Rosenheck, and Kasprow, 2003) uncovered the following indicators:
Nearly three-quarters (73%) of veteran inmates had been unemployed in the past 3 years;

- Roughly one-third (35%) had some psychiatric illness;

- Nearly two-thirds (62%) had a drug abuse or dependence problem; and

- Thirty-seven percent (37%) had experienced homelessness periods of more than 6 months.

Since the late 1970s, a single VA outreach staff member had visited veteran inmates in the Los Angeles County Jail, providing information on VA services available upon their release. However, VA social work leaders believed that a larger, more formal jail outreach program would be useful. The envisioned program would link inmates to the growing range of services available to homeless veterans. In the jail itself, VA workers could screen veterans and develop an initial discharge plan. Once released, inmates could go to the nearby downtown outpatient clinic for a more thorough assessment and receive temporary housing, if needed. Later, veterans could be placed in homeless transitional housing and residential mental health/drug treatment programs. VA medical care and vocational rehabilitation services would also be available. The hope was that treated and housed veterans could transition back into society as employed, self-sufficient individuals—instead of ending up homeless or back in jail.

In the 1990s, VA GLAHS embarked on an ambitious project to provide services to an estimated 20,000 homeless veterans in its service area (Nakashima et al., 2004). Within 10 years, VA GLAHS created over 900 transitional housing beds, specialized mental health and substance abuse treatment programs, and vocational rehabilitation services. To find homeless veterans, VA outreach workers canvassed local shelters, soup kitchens, the Skid Row area of downtown Los Angeles, and the beach parks of Santa Monica. Social work discharge planners for VA's inpatient programs also referred many veterans to the VA homeless program. During their outreach, VA staff noticed that many homeless veterans had recently been released from the large downtown Los Angeles County Jail.

The VA jail outreach program envisioned by social work leaders was novel in its scale and scope, as it would place five full-time VA outreach workers in the Los Angeles County Jail system. Annually, hundreds of released veteran inmates could be linked to a healthcare system providing a full array of health and rehabilitative services.

**Initial Barriers to the Jail Outreach Program**
Initially, VA social work leaders faced major obstacles in promoting a jail outreach program to VA GLAHS and LASD officials. First, there was the issue of stigma. VA administrators feared that released inmates represented potential safety and treatment compliance problems. Also, some VA medical center administrators were still wary about the VA’s role in providing social services (like housing and vocational rehabilitation) to its patients. They felt that taking on a non-medical role was going beyond the traditional scope of the institution.
Los Angeles County Sheriff staff identified their own concerns about a VA jail outreach program. Some staff believed that the jail’s role was more custodial than rehabilitative: to keep the general public safe from criminals. Additionally, there were concerns that having non-law enforcement (VA workers) in a correctional facility posed safety hazards. For example, meetings between VA staff and inmates required transporting both across the jail, increasing the opportunity for security breaches. Also, VA workers—without law enforcement training—might be more likely than Sheriff’s Department staff to be assaulted or held hostage. Finally, moving and securing individual inmates around the jail so that they could be seen by VA outreach workers required more staff time.

Applying the Political Economy Model
Despite the initial resistance of both the VA and Los Angeles County Sheriff officials, the VA social work leadership team successfully persuaded both institutions to collaborate on creating an expanded jail outreach program in 1999.

How did this happen? A useful way of explaining the process is through the use of a theoretical framework. We selected elements of the Political Economy Model (Hasenfeld and Brock, 1991) because the model synthesizes current methodological approaches to explain program implementation. As the name implies, it stresses the importance of authority, power, and resources in the implementation of social programming.

Particularly relevant to this paper is the model’s concept of “driving forces”: technological, economic, and power. Technological refers to the services provided to the client; the more rational and coherent the technology is (i.e., implementable, adequately addresses the client’s needs), the better the chance for success. Economic refers to the importance of having sufficient resources for the implementing agency to begin and maintain a program. While there are many definitions of power (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Hood, 1983), power in the context of the model refers to the ability of the implementing agency to elicit cooperation and compliance from stakeholders. Hasenfeld and Brock (1991) conclude that implementation is a “non-issue” when there is technological certainty, economic stability, and a concentration of power in the hands of the implementing agency.

Further, the Political Economy Model implies that: 1) Favorable technological, economic, and political circumstances must not only exist in order for a social program to begin, they must also be acted upon or exploited; and 2) leaders must be able to manipulate the environment to influence and secure the cooperation of stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals or entities that control a commodity (i.e., resources, services, authorization, an endorsement) needed for the program implementation. They may include, for example, a medical center director or the sheriff of a large urban jail.

Let us re-visit the implementation of the jail outreach program within the context of the three driving forces.

1) Technological influences— For its jail outreach program, VA GLAHS had a tested technology to treat individuals at risk for homelessness. It had medical
services and mental health and substance abuse treatment available at its three
main service sites (West Los Angeles, downtown Los Angeles, and the San
Fernando Valley) plus limited services at smaller VA clinics scattered throughout
Southern California. In addition, VA GLAHS’s hundreds of transitional housing
beds made it one of the largest housing providers for the homeless in Los Angeles
County. Thousands of homeless veterans were being seen and treated by VA staff
annually. VA GLAHS also had a staff of experienced outreach workers, many of
whom were formerly homeless and ex-felons. The idea was that this life-
experience staff could successfully relate to and engage incarcerated veterans.

Finally, the technology of providing VA outreach workers in the Los Angeles
County Jail had already been piloted. Since the 1970s, one VA staff member had
successfully provided outreach in the downtown Los Angeles County Jail on a
limited basis. He had demonstrated the feasibility of a jail outreach program, and
he had gained the trust and respect of many managers in the jail.

In short, VA brought to the proposed expanded jail outreach program a rich
service technology to assist veterans at risk for homelessness. An experienced
team of outreach workers was only the “tip of the spear” for an arsenal of VA
health and social services.

2) Economic influences—As noted above, the VA had substantial housing,
treatment, and staff resources to treat veterans released from jail. These
resources were attractive to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department officials in
the 1990s because they were facing criticism for the Department’s handling of
another at-risk group—the mentally ill, many of whom were homeless. In 1997,
both the U.S. Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union
threatened litigation, accusing LASD of providing inadequate care to inmates with
mental illness. These actions were highlighted in a series of articles by the Los
Angeles Times on mentally ill inmates in the Los Angeles County Jail (Daunt,
1997a; Daunt, 1997b; Daunt 1997c; Daunt, 1997d; Feldman & Lichtblau, 1996).

Moreover, public concerns about the jail heightened, as overcrowding forced
the sheriff to release many inmates early. By 1996, budget cuts had provoked
the closure of four county jails in 3 years, a retrenchment that resulted in 20%
fewer jail beds than in 1991 (Feldman & Lichtblau, 1996). Los Angeles Times
newspaper articles portrayed the early release policy as a risk to public safety by
highlighting the violent acts committed by offenders who, if not for early release,
would have been incarcerated at the time they committed their new crimes
(Daunt & Saar, 1996; Feldman & Lichtblau, 1996). Concerns were heightened in
2002 to 2004, when budget constraints again resulted in the early release of
thousands of inmates (Leonard, 2004).

Under ongoing governmental and public scrutiny for its handling of the
mentally ill and the early release of inmates, LASD was receptive to the idea of
VA GLAHS providing treatment to veteran inmates. A VA jail outreach program
would demonstrate that the Sheriff’s Department was attending to the needs of a
sub-group of its mentally ill inmates and promoting their recovery after release.
Such a program would help address critics’ concerns about the lack of existing
services in jails and public concerns about released inmates in the community.
If VA GLAHS represented an attractive resource to LASD for economic and political reasons, the reverse was also true—that is, there were economic benefits for the VA. In 1997, a new VA resource allocation model meant that the VA facility’s annual funding would be based on the number of individual veterans seen during the year. This translated roughly into the medical center receiving a base amount per patient for care provided (Department of Veterans Affairs, 1999a). This rate could be increased substantially for “complex” patients who were diagnosed with severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia. Thus, accessing the Los Angeles County Jail as a source of such patients was a potentially compelling argument for an expanded VA outreach program.

In summary, both VA GLAHS and LASD had economic resources and needs that made a partnership attractive. VA GLAHS brought to LASD new resources to serve some of their released inmates with mental health and homelessness issues, and the jail represented to VA a steady source of new patients that would bring additional financial resources to the medical center.

3) Political influences—Within the context of the favorable technological and economic circumstances described above, the VA social work leadership team embarked on a mission to educate, influence, and secure cooperation from two main stakeholders: the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the managers of VA GLAHS.

The power to influence these groups came in the form of a prominent Federal District Court judge, who was a former Marine Corps colonel and an advocate for homeless veterans. In addition, the judge and LA County Sheriff were personal friends. In 1999, the judge arranged a preliminary meeting between VA staff and Sheriff’s staff to discuss the proposed jail outreach program. The Sheriff already had a reputation for wanting to rehabilitate criminal offenders and to test new programs to accomplish that goal. After the meeting, the Sheriff involved his managers in designing and implementing the program with VA staff.

A greater challenge, perhaps, was securing the cooperation of VA GLAHS leadership. As noted earlier, some VA facility managers did not believe the VA’s mission included serving veteran inmates. To reduce the medical center’s opposition, the social work leadership team prepared a white paper that described the proposed jail outreach program and its potential to help hundreds of released veteran inmates rehabilitate through the expanding VA homeless program. The paper also emphasized the program’s potential to enroll new individuals in the VA system, which would mean more medical center funding under the resource allocation model. During a follow-up discussion, the social work leaders made a proposal to VA medical center facility managers: provide five temporary jail outreach staff positions, and if they did not pay for themselves in terms of enrolling new patients into the system within half a year, the positions would be re-allocated to a different VA GLAHS program. Managers accepted this offer and approved staffing for the program in 1999.

The judge used his influence to promote the new jail outreach program to the medical center and shepherd it through its early stages. For example, when a new VA GLAHS chief executive officer threatened to stop the jail outreach program, the judge arranged a meeting with the CEO’s boss (the VA network
director) and the Los Angeles County Sheriff. The network director was so impressed by the program that the CEO decided it was politically unsafe to stop it. Also, by that time, the jail outreach program was "paying for itself" by bringing new patients into the VA system. On average, the expanded jail outreach program was enrolling 175 new patients in the VA system every month.

**Challenges in Implementing the Jail Outreach Program**

As described above, the VA social work leadership team was successful in convincing VA GLAHS and LASD to initiate the jail outreach program. The Political Economy Model explains how leaders acted to overcome resistance and barriers to the program's start-up.

Like all new social programs—even those with considerable resources—the jail outreach program faced many challenges in its actual implementation. Lipsky (1980) notes there is often a disconnect between the vision and best intentions of upper-level policy makers and the "street level bureaucrats," or line staff, who must attempt to implement the new public policy. There were three major challenges to the actual jail outreach implementation: access issues, post-release coordination, and staffing issues.

- **Access issues**—VA outreach workers faced many challenges in meeting with veteran inmates in the jail. Securing cooperation from jail line staff was sometimes an issue. Jail officers—usually sheriff’s deputies—frequently rotated through positions, and officers new to the system were often unaware of the cooperative jail outreach program. In addition, a few deputies did not believe in the concept of treating and rehabilitating inmates, and unaware or unsupportive deputies sometimes hindered or denied outreach workers' access to the inmates. In response, VA staff periodically educated deputies about the program and developed personal working relationships. The Sheriff’s Department helped identify deputies who were veterans themselves, and he made them advocates of the program with their non-veteran peers. This strategy of educating deputies and identifying "champions" reduced line staff resistance to the program.

Even when they received cooperation from deputies, though, VA outreach staff faced other logistical barriers. Time was lost attempting to locate hundreds of identified veteran inmates from a daily log provided by the Sheriff's Department. Inmates were frequently shuttled back and forth across cells and units, so their exact locations weren't always known. Given delays in access, many veterans identified in the county database—especially those who were held only a few days—could not be contacted before their release.

- **Post-release coordination issues**—Completing a post-release discharge plan with a veteran inmate did not guarantee the plan's execution upon release. As stipulated by law, inmates could not be held for any longer than their sentences. Hundreds of inmates were released from the jail each day, and each release process took several hours. This meant that an inmate could be discharged any time during the week or
the 24-hour cycle (Fox, 2004). Inmates released on a weekend or during non-business hours could not immediately contact a VA staff person or visit the nearby VA downtown outpatient building about a mile away.

In response to the release problems, jail outreach staff worked with Sheriff’s staff and the Los Angeles County Court system to arrange planned releases for some veteran inmates by getting the courts to agree to release inmates early if they immediately entered a VA-specific drug treatment or transitional housing program. These inmates were released during a pre-scheduled window of time and transported directly from jail to the VA program.

In addition, the VA partnered with a nearby agency that served homeless veterans to provide transportation and temporary shelter to newly released veteran inmates who did not have a planned release. This VA-funded agency provided van shuttle service during peak release hours (8:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.) from the jail to an overnight shelter. The next morning, veterans were transported to a VA downtown clinic for services.

Even when an inmate actually made it to the downtown VA clinic, there was no absolute assurance that he would receive treatment. Service delays were common. Due to staff shortages at the VA GLAHS, an appointment for an initial physical and mental health exam could take a week or two. (There was an original plan to conduct the exams in jail, but a 1999 VA regulation prohibited the provision of treatment in an institution that was already required to provide medical care. [See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 1999b.]) And after the initial exam, there could be further delays in placing veterans in a long-term, transitional housing program. Many private community agency partners that provided VA transitional housing refused to accept individuals with a history of sex offenses or those who were using a legal but potentially abusable substance, such as methadone or painkillers.

Efforts to temporarily house veterans who were waiting for their VA health exam or transitional housing placement were uneven. Two VA-supported shelters were made available to veterans, with maximum stays of 2 to 3 months. One of the shelters, however, was perpetually full. The other was 8 miles away from the downtown VA clinic. There were non-VA shelters close to the downtown VA clinic in the Skid Row area, but some clients said these were too dangerous or too confining, particularly after they had just been released from jail. For various reasons, some veterans remained out on the streets while waiting for VA services. Many relapsed back to substance abuse or criminal activity.

- **Staff issues**—The work environment remained an ongoing issue for staff. Some staff found it difficult to work in conditions characterized by high security and perceived potential danger. Some worried that working with an incarcerated population raised their risk for diseases such as tuberculosis. Some paraprofessional outreach workers felt they should be paid more because they were working in the jail setting. (Eventually, retention bonuses were obtained for the paraprofessional workers.) As a
result, periodic staff turnover was common. Changes in VA outreach staff also meant, periodically, fewer staff to see inmates as well as down time as new staff were hired and trained.

In particular, the jail outreach program could not recruit or retain a licensed social worker to serve as program director because of the unattractiveness of the work environment. Thus, the program did not have a strong leader who could provide clinical expertise, professional supervision, and advocacy. In the absence of a jail outreach director, a team of VA homeless clinic managers shared management of the program. These individuals, however, did not have sufficient day-to-day knowledge to run the program optimally. Staff cohesion and their ability to work efficiently with Sheriff’s staff suffered.

In summary, issues involving access to inmates, post-release coordination, and staffing remained ongoing challenges to the jail outreach program. Nevertheless, some implementation issues were addressed successfully. In fact, VA staff did develop a working relationship with Sheriff’s Department staff over time, and salary bonuses did help in retaining some VA paraprofessional staff. In addition, the VA partnered with an agency to provide transportation and short-term shelter for released inmates and arranged planned releases for some inmates so they could be transferred immediately to a VA program.

**Jail Outreach Outcomes**

Despite the challenges it faced initially, the expanded jail outreach program has existed continuously since 1999. Approximately 1,300 veteran inmates are contacted in the jail each year.

Has the program had an impact? McGuire, Rosenheck, and Kasprow (2003) examined the outcomes of 1,676 veterans who were contacted while they were incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail between May 1, 1997 and October 1, 1999. Thirty-eight percent (38%) (640) received some kind of post-release VA service during the year after their contact in jail, with 30% receiving mental health outpatient services and 29% receiving medical and surgical outpatient services. These utilization rates are lower than the rates of homeless veterans contacted by VA outreach workers in the community. (For example, 84% of all veterans who received outreach in the community during the same time period were receiving some kind of VA service one year later.) One reason may be access: veterans contacted in the community could frequently be driven immediately to a VA clinic for care, an option not available to the incarcerated veterans who often had days in jail left to finish their sentences and were then released during non-business hours.

Positively, the success of the VA outreach program has encouraged Los Angeles County to develop other rehabilitative services for inmates. In 2000, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department opened its Community Transition Unit (CTU). The CTU’s focus is to provide vocational and educational programs for inmates in the jail and to link released inmates to jobs, housing, and healthcare. Currently, the CTU works with many other public and private agencies besides VA to provide services for inmates in jail and after their release.
Challenges for Program Developers

The greatest challenge for the jail outreach program was to develop a seamless delivery of care for released inmates. The first few days of release are a critical time for inmates, and the risk of relapsing back to homelessness, substance abuse, and crime is very high. VA GLAHS and LASD envisioned an orderly transfer of released inmates to a VA transitional housing program. However, they faced many barriers, including 24-hour release scheduling, lack of sufficient shelter space to house veterans until they could be processed by VA, delays in the VA processing (assessment, examination) itself, and difficulties placing individuals with a history of sex offenses and narcotic use in transitional housing programs.

Program developers considering this model should identify potential barriers to care delivery in their implementation planning. For example, will systems enable released inmates to be picked up immediately and housed temporarily until they are processed into a treatment system? How can processing time be shortened to reduce client AWOLs and overcrowding at temporary shelters? What transitional housing/residential treatment resources are available for traditionally hard-to-place clients, such as those with a history of sex offenses?

Program developers should also ask what new partnerships could be created to address delivery issues that are beyond the scope and capability of a single agency. The jail outreach program at first relied on collaboration between two main partners, the VA GLAHS and the Sheriff’s Department. When they identified an unmet need for transporting and housing recently released inmates, however, they brought in a third agency, a local community program, to provide shuttle and shelter services. Another important partner to engage is the local courts system. As noted, VA GLAHS had some success in arranging planned releases with the district attorney’s office to ensure that veteran inmates would be released at a set time so they could be immediately transferred to a VA clinic.

Whether the implementation of the jail outreach program at VA GLAHS qualifies as a “success” remains open to discussion. There was no control or comparison site to see whether other strategies could have been more effective in serving veterans released from jail. In addition, our outcome data consists of primary treatment utilization data, which is, at best, a proxy variable. Receiving VA treatment itself is not a guarantee of a successful long-term outcome, e.g., staying sober, remaining independently housed, or not recidivating. Currently, the authors are completing a study that will examine the follow-up status of veterans who received outreach in jail and VA services after release.

Conclusion

This paper offers a case study in program implementation. We used the Hasenfeld and Brock (1991) Political Economy Model as a framework to explain the importance of technology, resources, and political power in program start-up. VA social work leaders were successful in persuading VA GLAHS and LASD managers to approve a jail outreach program that used existing technology (VA services) and benefited both the veteran inmates and the institutions (economically) as well. The jail outreach program has resulted in a number of homeless
inmates being contacted in jail, with a sizable percentage of these actually receiving some kind of VA mental health or medical services after they were released.

It is clear that implementation problems—namely access, post-release, and staffing issues—have challenged the program’s effectiveness. Implementation is an ongoing, iterative process. Establishing social policy is only a first step; translating the vision at the street or jail cell level requires a willingness to review programming constantly and take corrective actions when possible. The program must also be evaluated in terms of the impact it makes on the lives of its clients. The VA GLAHS jail outreach program will ultimately be measured by whether it improved the housing, health, and legal status of the veterans it served.

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Moving from Prisons to Jails: Who Knew?

In the pieces that follow, two former prison administrators who are now chief administrators of local jails share their insights about the differences between managing prisons and jails. As increasing numbers of corrections professionals are now following a career path from prison to jail, the experiences of Tom Campbell and Christopher Webb can shed an interesting light on this sometimes difficult transition.

Tom Campbell, Director, Louisville (Kentucky) Metro Department of Corrections

Tom Campbell began his career as Recreation Director at the Kentucky Correctional for Women in 1972 and was promoted to case manager 2 years later. After becoming Unit Manager at the Blackburn Correctional Complex (a minimum security facility) in 1976, he was promoted to Deputy Warden at the Kentucky State Reformatory in 1979 and stayed there 12 years. He served as Director of Operations in the DOC beginning in 1990 and was Warden at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex (1993–1994) and Green River Correctional Complex (1994–1996). After being promoted to Deputy Commissioner for Adult Institutions in 1996–1999, he retired and came back as Executive Director of the Parole Board for 2 years. He then served as Commissioner for the Corrections Department for 7 months, resigning for health reasons. He was asked to “fill in” as Director for Metro Corrections in January 2005, but he became very interested in the job and was appointed to the permanent position after 2 months.

After spending 30 years with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, I thought I was fairly well-equipped to manage a jail. Even though I had done a couple of consulting jobs with jails before I took my present job as Director of the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections, however, I was not prepared for what I found.

Inmate turnover. The sheer number of inmates who are booked/released in the facility is phenomenal compared to turnover in prisons. We book and release approximately 38,000 inmates each year in our facility. We admit and release more inmates in a day than some prisons do in several months. Sometimes this figure equates to 150 or so admitted and a similar number released per day.
When I worked in the prison, if someone told me we were getting 150 inmates in on one day, I would have thought they were insane. Handling the paperwork, money, property, etc., for numbers like this is mind-boggling and puts tremendous strain on the staff.

**Inmate movement outside the facility.** In jails, staff have the burden of moving inmates to and from court appearances much more frequently than in prisons, where court appearances might only be required a few times a week.

**Inmates' condition at arrival.** Inmates transferred to prisons have already been detoxed, examined medically, and had a chance to settle down and accept their fate (even if they don't like it). Inmates coming into jail are often drunk or high, frequently ill, emotionally upset, anxious about what will happen to them, and often don't have a clue about obtaining proper legal representation.

**Inmate classification.** The classification of inmates in jail is more difficult than in prisons because of the various factors that have to be considered. In prison, all inmates are already sentenced, and after their initial institutional placement, classification is based mostly on an inmate’s program needs, behavior, and level of sophistication. In a jail, there are pre-trial misdemeanants, pre-trial felons, sentenced misdemeanants, sentenced felons who will stay for only a short period of time, inmates with pending notorious crimes, young and old, sick and healthy, and so forth. It is a continuous battle to classify appropriately, especially when there is very limited bed space available.

**Inmates' freedom of movement.** Inmates' overall freedom of movement is much more limited in jails than it is in prisons. In most prisons, inmates have the freedom to take themselves to various programs and services, and they can take care of many things themselves, such as doing their own wash, if machines are available, or taking their clothes to the laundry. They can go to the commissary and purchase products. They can go to the school, vocational school, industries, etc. They can go to the pill line or to the chow hall to eat. In jail, it is just the opposite; we must take services and programs to them, including meals, medical services, counseling, linen and clothing, commissary, and so forth. This puts a tremendous burden on staff.

**Inmate programs.** The majority of jail inmates are with us a very short time and therefore difficult to place in an effective treatment plan. It is difficult to provide as many programs for jail inmates as for prison inmates because of program space limitations and short-term stays. Prisons can offer vocational training, industries, OJT programs, etc., and they usually have the space and inmates to keep these programs full. We offer limited educational programs and self-help groups in the jail and no vocational programs, due to space limitations and other logistical issues. Jails—at least this jail—are more security-oriented and less program-oriented than prisons. Staff here would prefer that inmates have no programs or movement out of their living areas, whereas in prison, the staff encouraged inmates to go to programs and out of their living areas.
Inmate behavior. The behavior problems of inmates seem to be greater in jails than in prisons. I think this is often due to the uncertainty that inmates are feeling, the different cultures of inmates who are living together, and even the way staff treat inmates. Many staff don’t see their role as helpers but as keepers. It is much more difficult to encourage good behavior in jails than it is in prisons. In jail, we have no “good time” to take away and no ability to threaten sending an inmate to a higher security facility. There are not as many privileges to lose in jail.

Staff experience. One of the biggest differences I have found is that most of the jail staff have worked only in this facility and have only a limited view of how things should be. In prisons, there are many promotions to other facilities or joint meetings where information is shared and everyone learns from each other. Jails are stand-alone operations, for the most part, and staff can’t benefit from that information-sharing with those in other facilities. I think this isolation is why jails should be encouraged to bring in staff from other agencies. I also think that is what the LJN is all about—sharing information and learning from others.

Staff unions. One of the biggest adjustments for me has been in dealing with the unions, though, of course, this may not be an issue in other states. After not having to work with unions in the Kentucky Corrections Department, it has been an eye opener for me to have three different unions in our jail. The way the contract with our sworn staff is written places many limitations on management in controlling the work force. Assignments to better posts, promotions, and shifts are based more on seniority than on management needs or the past work performance of the employee. Staff seem to be more concerned about what is in it for them than with the overall needs of our agency. There seems to be a more distinct separation between management (administration) and the staff in a union environment—more of an “us versus them” attitude.

Staff training. I have found that training for our local department is more in-depth and challenging than the initial training provided at the prison level. However, I don’t believe this is true for smaller jails that don’t have the luxury of their own training staff. Our training academy lasts 8 weeks compared to the state Corrections Academy’s 4 weeks. Our sworn staff are also sworn peace officers with powers of arrest. Many of them work at second jobs, affording them the opportunity to supplement their incomes in law enforcement-type positions. Our screening for new employees is much more in-depth than the prison’s, as we polygraph, drug test, conduct full physicals, background checks, and test.

Budgeting. From a management perspective, budgeting is much more difficult in the jail. It is very hard to establish a baseline budget when you have so many variables that affect your population. In prisons, you usually have a set number of beds and staff, and you can plan accordingly. If any of the facility’s variables is going to change, you usually have plenty of time to plan for it. In jail, many things can change your numbers overnight or in just a few days. This, in turn, affects everything, including food, clothing, medical services, bedding, linens, etc. If the police department conducts a “sting” operation, all of a sudden you are inundated
with inmates. Weather, community events, local ordinances, legislative changes, and other occurrences can have a major impact on your population and budget.

**Local politics.** Local politics are more of a factor in jails than prisons. In the local community, you must develop good communications and rapport with the judges, Commonwealth Attorney, County Attorney, police department, Sheriff’s Office, pre-trial agency, and several other local agencies, religious groups, and concerned citizens. In prisons, you don’t have as many contacts with these offices or agencies; unless there is an issue, they leave you alone.

**Media contact.** Contact with and exposure to the media are much higher at the local level than in prisons. Local news media representatives want to report on just about everything that happens in the jail, and issues that were small in the prison are large in the local media.

Christopher R. Webb, Administrator, Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority, Lynchburg, Virginia

Christopher Webb graduated from Lynchburg College in 1974 with a B.S. Degree in Psychology. He received his Masters Degree in Business Administration in 1984, also from Lynchburg College. He began his career with the Virginia Department of Corrections in March 1975. His experience with VDOC spanned a total of 21 years. During that time he worked as a Rehabilitation Counselor, Program Specialist, Superintendent of the Chatham Correctional Unit, and Superintendent of the Rustburg Correctional Unit. He has served in his current position of Administrator for the Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority since August 1996. The Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority serves the jurisdictions of the Cities of Bedford and Lynchburg and the Counties of Bedford, Campbell, and Halifax, Virginia.

I made my transition from the Virginia Department of Corrections to the Blue Ridge Regional Jail Authority, headquartered in Lynchburg, Virginia, in July 1996. I had worked for a little over 21 years with the Department of Corrections in a variety of capacities and was in charge of an institution for the last 14 years. My perception of local jails during my prison tenure was that jails had it made in the correctional business because they only kept individuals through sentencing, then sent their problems off to the Department of Corrections, which then had to deal with them over the long term. I guess I bought into the notion that running a local jail was a piece of cake compared to running a state correctional facility. I can safely say now, after 10 years in the local jail business, that my early perceptions couldn’t have been more wrong. The differences and difficulties involved in running a jail as opposed to a prison came in many forms.

**High visibility.** I immediately noticed that the local jail had no public relations or media liaison to which inquiring reporters could be shifted. I also received a baptism by fire when I realized that I would be the face of our organization and,
consequently, all the elected officials in all the jurisdictions we serve expected “as needed” access to me. This entailed countless appearances before city councils and county boards of supervisors. I guess it could be said that I enjoyed considerable insulation in a state Department of Corrections, but no such luxury existed at the local level.

**High volume of inmates.** It became very clear to me early in my transition that while a single prison’s population changes slowly over time, a local jail’s population changes significantly from month to month because of the tremendous volume of individuals booked into and out of jails. State correctional professionals would be shocked, as I was, at the sheer volume of individuals local correctional professionals must deal with over the course of a year.

**Diversity of the population.** The single greatest difference for me between state correctional work and local correctional work is the diversity within the populations of those who are incarcerated. State correctional facilities tend to have fairly homogeneous populations, usually dictated by classification departments and guided by custody levels. Local jails, on the other hand, are responsible for dealing with any and all offenders sent their way. This means that local jails get both male and female inmates. (My 21 years in state corrections didn’t come close to preparing me for some of the unique challenges that supervising women offenders poses.) Individuals come to jail directly from the streets, and, consequently, many are still under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol or are in poor health (both medically and psychologically). Sometimes you don’t even know the identity of the person incarcerated.

**Record keeping.** The complexity of record keeping in local jails is another difference from state prisons. Many detainees have bond possibilities and multiple charges—all of which must be kept straight to avoid releasing someone who shouldn’t be or, conversely, keeping someone in jail who should be let out.

**Contact with courts.** Local jails must work with many different courts, defense attorneys, and commonwealth attorneys to interpret court orders, answer family and defense attorneys’ complaints, respond to inquiries about court orders/sentences, and clear up any confusion about what the court actually ordered.

Looking back on my transition from state corrections to local corrections, I can now say that I have a healthy respect for both jobs and the people who do this work. Each situation has its own set of challenges, and I certainly have come to understand that correctional work in a local jail setting is no “walk in the park.”

I hope anyone thinking of making such a transition considers some of the points I’ve mentioned and also realizes that working in local jails is every bit as challenging and demanding as working in a state correctional facility. I would encourage anyone considering such a transition to contact someone who has worked in both state and local corrections in order to benefit from his or her experiences. ■
How the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office Regained Control of the County’s Detention Facilities from Corrections Corporation of America

by Tim Albin, Chief Deputy, Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office, Tulsa, Oklahoma

This article recounts how the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office first lost control of the local jails to a private corporation and then regained it. The story summarizes the chronology of events and highlights the problems the Sheriff’s Office faced over the course of more than 6 years.

1986–1989: Bond Issues Fail

In 1986, in response to the conditions of the Tulsa County detention facilities, Sheriff Frank Thurman pushed for a bond issue that would allow some funding for the escalating cost of repairs and maintenance of the already aging facilities. The bond issue failed.

In November 1988, new sheriff Stanley Glanz was elected. When he took office in January 1989, the average daily jail count was 552. In October 1989, Sheriff Glanz again petitioned for a bond issue to provide the funding necessary to address the poor conditions of the facility. Again, the bond issue failed.

The jail that Sheriff Glanz inherited consisted of three separate facilities: the county jail located on the eighth and ninth floors of the County Courthouse, the city jail located on the third floor of the city building, and the Adult Detention Center located on Charles Page Boulevard. The total employees in the three facilities averaged about 200. Each facility had a linear design, as did most jails built between the 1920s and 1950s.

1992: Tent City

In March 1992, the jail system was so overcrowded that the sheriff placed tents in the exercise yards at the Adult Detention Center; this became known in Tulsa County as “Tent City.” Inmates were housed in tents until the population declined enough to house them safely in the jail facilities.
1994: A New Addition to the Adult Detention Center
The sheriff finally obtained enough funding to build an addition on the Adult Detention Center, which opened on February 24, 1994. Due to the sheriff’s interest in improvement and the rise in direct supervision facilities around the country, the new addition was a podular remote surveillance pod. The guards sat in a control center, able to observe each of the four housing units below, using window access for viewing and intercoms for communication.

Despite this addition, however, the inmate population continued to grow, and soon the new addition to the Adult Detention Center was once again severely overcrowded.

In response to a complaint from the local health department, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an investigation of the county’s detention facilities on the basis of unconstitutional treatment of the inmates. Though the Department’s final report did not find that the treatment of inmates was unconstitutional, it did find the facilities themselves unconstitutional. The Department of Justice and the Sheriff’s Office thus agreed to a consent decree, which mandated that a certain number of employees would be maintained and that reports would be sent on a regular basis, providing information specifically requested in the Decree.

However, the Consent Decree was never enacted because Sheriff Glanz, armed with the findings of the Department of Justice investigation and the Consent Decree, petitioned the legislature for a sales tax as an alternate funding mechanism for the jail. He successfully achieved a change in state law.

1995: Finally, Support through a Sales Tax
Sheriff Glanz and many detention facility staff, both deputies and civilians, took to the streets in preparation for the upcoming vote on the sales tax issue, to be held in September 1995. They provided necessary information to the citizens of Tulsa County by standing on street corners, walking in neighborhoods, and attending public meetings.

The proposed tax consisted of a quarter-cent ($0.0025) sales tax to build a new facility, to be relinquished once the building was paid for. Another quarter-cent sales tax would support facility operations and would be permanent. The sales tax passed.

The wording in the successful initiative allowed for the formation of a Criminal Justice Trust Authority. The Authority consists of the three county commissioners, the mayor of Tulsa, and three additional mayors from the cities within Tulsa County. The Trust Authority is responsible for the oversight of jail operations related to cost and the earned tax revenues.

1996: Planning for a New Facility
In 1996, the Sheriff’s Office formed a Transition Team of seven individuals to create, plan, develop, and implement everything related to the new facility. The team began with the architectural development of the facility. After travelling
across the country to view various styles of facilities, they provided leadership as plans were drawn for the new jail.

Once the architectural plans were completed, the Sheriff’s Office team began developing the procedures to be used in operating the new facility, including the training of officers and inmates, the daily master clock of scheduled events, the “how-to’s” and “how-not-to’s” for every conceivable function of the facility, as well as planning the logistics for transferring the inmates from the old facilities to the new one.

1997: Trust Authority Acts Behind the Scenes
In September of 1997, the Trust Authority began to entertain the idea of bringing in a private company to operate the new facility, thinking it could do so at less cost. Unknown to the Sheriff’s Office, the Trust Authority actively pursued the idea of privatization.

Later that same year, the Trust Authority contacted the Sheriff’s Office to inform the sheriff that the operation of the facility would be put out for bid and that the Sheriff’s Office would be expected to respond to the request for a bid, along with several private companies.

1998–1999: CCA Enters the Picture
On July 24, 1998, the contract to operate the jail was awarded to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). Over the next several months, the sheriff brought suit against the Trust Authority on the grounds that Oklahoma statute gives the responsibility of the jail to local sheriffs, not to a private organization. When they lost in the lower courts, the Commissioners and Trust Authority took their appeal to the Oklahoma State Supreme Court, where the decision was overturned. The sheriff ultimately had to relinquish operation of the Tulsa County Jail to Corrections Corporation of America.

The Trust Authority fired the Sheriff’s Office Transition Team, bringing in a warden from CCA and a civilian from the Sheriff’s Office to complete the building of the new jail. In 1999, the Trust Authority gave possession of the new facility to CCA, at which time the sheriff was forced to lay off more than 225 employees.

2002: Problems Surface
Through the first years, it seemed that handing over the operations of the jail to a private company had not been an error in judgment, as many citizens and Sheriff’s Office employees believed. However, during the 2002 budget year, the Trust Authority began to encounter money problems, just as many had predicted.

As a result of increased costs reported by CCA, the Trust Authority began paying out to the private contractor more monies than the tax revenue stream was bringing in, leaving the county to pick up the difference. It wasn’t until the entire county budget was in jeopardy that the Trust Authority decided to go out for bid once again on operating the jail, in hopes of salvaging what was left of the county budget.
2005: Jail Operations Return to the Sheriff’s Office

Late in 2004, the Trust Authority opened bidding for the operation of the jail facility. It received a number of interested inquiries. The final decision came down to four agencies competing for the facility: three privately managed companies and the Sheriff’s Office.

Based on the figures stated in the RFP, the Sheriff’s Office developed a proposal for running the jail facility with a budget just over $19 million for the first year, with a 3% increase projected for the next year. The Sheriff’s Office did not spend thousands of dollars on preparing the proposal. We believed that three factors—the truth in reporting, the truth in budgetary issues, and the fact that money saved by the Sheriff’s Office would ultimately revert to the county budget as a whole—would present themselves so clearly that the Trust Authority would have no choice but to revert the jail operation back to the Sheriff’s Office, where it should have been all along.

On March 18, 2005, after having viewed each of the four presentations, the Trust Authority voted to return the operations of the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center to Sheriff Stanley Glanz and the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office. In the next few weeks, a transition team was assembled, equipment was moved, and the transition process had begun. The Sheriff’s Office had 103 days until the actual move into the facility that, 6 years ago, it had campaigned for, designed, planned for, and then handed over to someone else.

The six-member transition team worked 60- to 100-hour weeks hiring more than 300 people and training more than 500 employees—those staying on with the Sheriff’s Office, those newly hired, and all other certified and civilian Sheriff’s Office staff. Team members worked on developing policy and procedure, creating post orders, taking inventory, planning for emergency operations, and trying to think of every possible item needing attention, from inmate money to the ordering of clothes, from officer uniforms to feeding times.

Each team member was assigned to address specific areas of the facility from both a procedural and policy viewpoint. Once the policy was written, one team member was assigned to review, correct, and format all policies for the facility, ensuring that the policy itself met the standards of the American Correctional Association. Post orders were drafted and reviewed in the same manner.

Once the team moved into the facility, every member began to look at all the different procedures, all current contracts, and all other items as they emerged or were uncovered through investigation. While reviewing the contract between the Trust Authority and CCA, the team found that the contract specified that, should the private organization be released or removed from operating the facility, the organization had to leave the facility in “like new” condition when they left it.
2005: Tension Between the Sheriff’s Office and CCA

After moving into the facility, the transition team was immediately put on notice that things would not be easy, as tensions were rising between the two organizations. Every time the team came to an agreed-on solution with the existing warden or the CCA point of contact, one or the other would be moved and be unavailable. Within a month of beginning the transition, the warden was transferred and another brought in to take his place. The new warden was much less cooperative.

Within days of moving in, it was clear that direct communication between CCA employees and the transition team would be problematic. When seeking documentation or a meeting with specific CCA personnel, team members submitted a written request. However, they were often informed that the documentation was proprietary or that what CCA did would not help the team at all in trying to understand a specific process or procedure.

Within a few weeks of the decision to change operators, CCA and the Trust Authority brought in a certified County Assessor to conduct an exit “punch list,” detailing areas of concern to be addressed prior to CCA’s departure. After waiting weeks for the final report from the assessor, the transition team conducted a “punch list” investigation of its own.

While the assessor’s report consisted of fewer than 10 pages, the Sheriff’s Office report was more than 50 pages long. It included pictures of the worst areas, some of which were not even mentioned in the assessor’s report. The Sheriff’s Office report made note of the areas mentioned in the original report, elaborating on the condition of each area and identifying many areas that had been overlooked. After the Trust Authority reviewed the report, CCA was allowed to respond to the report but was held accountable for the items and areas listed.

July 1, 2005: A Changing of the Flags

At 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 2005, the Sheriff’s Office conducted a changing of the flags in front of the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center. The front of the facility now displayed the United States Flag, the Oklahoma Flag, and the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office Flag, as it should have for the past 6 years.

On Friday, July 7th, the Tulsa County Health Department presented itself in the lobby of the facility, intent on conducting an inspection of the kitchen. The inspectors were escorted through the kitchen. Their report was not favorable, and it listed several issues that were required to be addressed before the following Monday, or the facility would run the risk of being closed down by the Health Department. The report also listed repairs that were to be addressed in a timeline that was also to be sent to the Health Department the following Monday.

Having some suspicion about why the Health Department would come for an inspection so quickly after the Sheriff’s Office took over, the transition team requested and acquired the jail’s inspection records for the previous 3 years. The team found that several of the issues raised on the most recent inspection report had not been noted on the earlier inspection reports. One item, for instance, was the wash station located in the washing room. The sink had been removed more
than 4 years prior to the current report, but it was never mentioned on any of the previous reports. This was only one of many similar issues.

The following Monday, the inspectors returned, conducted their inspection, and met with ranked employees of the Sheriff’s Office to discuss the repairs that were completed and to determine whether the kitchen was capable of passing. During the meeting, the inspectors were asked about discrepancies such as the wash station. An inspector replied that he did not know why it had not been mentioned in earlier reports, other than the previous inspector might have gotten tunnel vision. The feelings of suspicion were therefore not appeased.

Transition: Some Things Handled Inadequately
During the transition, many things were forgotten, overlooked, or not known, creating situations that we handled as each demanded. Given the short time the Sheriff’s Office had to prepare for such a massive operation, the problems have been minor.

Issues that the Sheriff’s Office could have handled better included the facility inventory, key control, and the disbanding of the transition team.

- **Inventory.** Prior to July 2005, the inventory for the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center belonged to three different entities. The first was CCA, which purchased equipment and furniture from its own budget; the second was the Trust Authority, which had purchased big items from the operating fund generated by the sales tax revenue; and the third was complicated. This category included equipment bought using the start-up monies the Trust Authority gave to CCA in 1999 to stock the facility prior to moving in the inmates and employees.

  Because of the complexity of the records and the fact that there was so much inventory, the actual confirmation of the inventory didn't take place until late June 2005. This did not allow the Sheriff’s Office the necessary time to order parts needed to operate the facility. The parts and equipment that were owned by CCA—such as tools, major equipment replacement parts, repair equipment, and key machines—were removed from the facility in June, leaving the Sheriff’s Office very few options when it came to repair or replacement of equipment.

- **Key control.** The key control issue, which was not explored in great depth prior to the transition, appeared to be a major mistake on our part. Although we attempted to place someone in the key control office prior to the transition, no training took place. As a result, on July 1 at exactly 12:01 a.m., CCA employees left, handing Sheriff’s Office personnel the keys and access cards on the way out, but without sharing any knowledge of how to use them.

  Fortunately, the Sheriff’s Office had hired a CCA employee who had some prior experience with the key system, and, with the help of a Transition Team member, we limped along until a new system could be implemented. As of this date, we are still in the process of fine-tuning the
system, but for the most part, we have developed a key control system that works for our facility.

- **Disbanding the transition team.** Normally, transition teams stay in place for up to 6 months after an official transition. But because the Sheriff’s Office was experiencing a shortage of manpower elsewhere, the transition team was disbanded, allowing its members to return to their original duty assignments.

When it came time to disband, each team member was told to write up what was still unresolved and hand it off to someone else in the area to deal with, explaining the idea behind the project. Many of these projects have still not been addressed at all, much less completed, due to the overwhelming workload of many of those involved in the transition.

As a result of the overall transition problems and last-minute fixes, an After Action Report was not completed for a few months after the actual transition. The actual report, completed in September 2005, consists of three, three-ring binders containing documents related to the transition, from meeting minutes to miscellaneous notes, from news releases to various reports.

Had there been more time, the Sheriff’s Office might have handled some of these issues differently, and some of the problems would not have come up at all. With time, I have no doubt that we would have been able to address most issues completely. However, for all that we had to do and the time in which we had to do it, we were quite successful.
Shelby County’s Training Advisory Committee:

Developing a Collaborative Corrections Training Program

Martin and Rosazza (2004) assert that staff training is one of the most powerful interventions available to corrections administrators. Unfortunately, in many facilities, training activities are essentially segregated from the overall management strategy. When this is the case, training is not based on needs but rather on staff preferences, institutional culture, training capacity, and historical precedence. Thus, corrections administrators often are charged with addressing policies and procedures that may have contributed to negligent hiring, training, management, and retention of underperforming staff.

Indeed, some departments are experiencing a situation that could be referred to as “professional retardation.” By “professional retardation,” we are suggesting that some departments may have under-developed training programs and have generally failed to train upper-level managers to take advantage of technological, managerial, and administrative innovations in the field of corrections. Wardens, administrators, upper-level staff, and managers of programs and facilities sometimes lack the skills and training necessary to adequately perform their jobs. In many cases, these administrators may have limited management or administrative training, or none at all. It is common for top officials to start at an entry-level position and work their way to upper management through a series of promotions over an often-lengthy career (Finkelstein 1996). Though these administrators may have an impeccable command of the day-to-day operation of a facility, they may not have adequate training, education, or experience to perform optimally in upper-level management positions.

The Challenge of Corrections Administration

There is much that can be done to improve the preparation of corrections administrators and upper managers to perform their jobs. Identifying the key issues and shortcomings is the first part of solving the problem. Given the usual promotion practices of most correctional institutions, it is not uncommon for veteran
administrators to have only limited specialized management training and/or expertise. Although there are many exceptional corrections administrators who do not possess advanced degrees or other corrections certifications, there are many benefits to pursuing these qualifications. Given the vast diversity of the responsibilities of upper-level corrections managers, advanced training is needed that goes beyond the skills learned on-the-job. Correction administrators, especially newly promoted ones, have to be prepared to tackle issues they may not have been confronted with while they were moving up through the ranks.

The most important issues for new administrators can be grouped into four broad areas: institutional culture, the internal environment, the external environment, and self-management (McCampbell, 2002).

- **Institutional culture**—Administrators must be aware of the institution’s history and community relationships. Understanding the particular role that the institution has in the bigger picture will help an administrator in his or job performance. In addition, it is imperative that administrators have a grasp of other cultural issues relating to the correctional facility itself. Having a strong knowledge of both the staff and the inmate population is essential.

- **Internal environment**—Administrators should focus on the skills and knowledge necessary to lead the corrections facility from the inside. Increasingly, managers must be aware of and adept at handling issues such as strategic planning, fiscal decision-making, human resource management, and internal personal relations.

- **External environment**—Public relations are an overriding concern, because the public’s perception and media’s presentation of the facility are very important. Administrators must be able to communicate effectively with government entities at all levels, and developing a rapport with officials from other criminal justice agencies is essential.

- **Self-management**—Separating the rigors of the job, family responsibilities, and social obligations is a challenging task. Administrators need to recognize the power that comes with their position and the impact it has not only on themselves and their family but also on the institution itself. Corrections administrators face the same types of stressors that managers in other industries face, and it is very important to take measures to minimize their effects (McCampbell, 2002).

In order to address these issues effectively, upper-level managers should possess a combination of work experience, educational preparation, and vocational training. Top administrators are required to oversee the training of subordinates, address staff retention, keep up with technological advances, monitor compliance with policies and procedures, and promote employee morale. In addition, top managers must also be able to oversee budgets, track inventory, pay attention to shifting political climates, and competently deal with a range of public relations. Most of these tasks require specialized training and skills development.
With the ever-growing responsibilities of a corrections administrator, some have suggested that an education (or training) based in business administration would lead to greater success than a background in public administration (McCurdy 1978). Given the diversity of tasks and the consequences of having under-trained administrators, it is imperative that corrections departments scrutinize the performance and capabilities of their acting top administrators and address any areas of needed training. Moreover, the administrators of today are responsible for fostering the development of the leaders of tomorrow. A more educated and diverse individual will likely make a better administrator in the long run (McCampbell, 2002).

**Issues Related to Training**

There is little question that management training is extremely important. Not only must facility administrators be extensively trained, they must also be responsible for overseeing the management and training of other personnel. If administrators do not stress the importance of training or are not trained themselves, they will be less effective as both a manager and a leader. In some instances, corrections administrators are promoted too quickly and are unable to make a successful jump from employee to manager or from manager to respected leader. Corrections administrators have reported that they feel competent in many areas but acknowledge that they lack training in other important areas (McCampbell, 2002). However, according to a survey sent to all jails of a certain rated capacity, nearly 40% of these jails offered 6 weeks or fewer of general training. More disheartening is the fact that even less attention is given to communications training; 36% percent of respondents indicated they received 8 hours or fewer of communications training per year (Tartaro, 2002).

Perhaps most importantly, corrections administrators should have a system in place to accurately track the progress of employee and supervisor training. At any given time, an administrator should be able to tell what training employees have received and how long it has been since they were trained in a particular area. Having future training plans set up and reviewed on a regular basis is also essential. There should be no doubt about the training status of every employee of a correctional facility (McCampbell, 2002).

**Pursuing a Local Solution**

Aware of these training issues, several corrections administrators with facilities in Shelby County (Memphis), Tennessee established a working group known as the Corrections Training Advisory Committee. The committee is comprised of representatives from agencies at the county, state, and federal levels, plus faculty of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Memphis. It was created under the guidance of Chief James Coleman of the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office (Jail Division). Hired in 2001, Chief Coleman recognized many training and other staff needs and sought an innovative, collaborative, and cost-effective strategy to address the concerns.

To achieve these goals, Chief Coleman invited the top corrections administrators in Shelby County to come together to discuss the idea of a corrections Command College. The focus of this initiative was to develop future leaders of
the agencies but not to alienate or otherwise discount tenured employees. The Advisory Committee participants included representatives from the following four Shelby County corrections agencies: the Federal Corrections Institution—Memphis; the Mark H. Luttrell Correctional Center, a Tennessee state prison; the Shelby County Division of Corrections; and the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, Jail Division. Representatives from the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Memphis also belonged to the Advisory Committee. A number of support staff, appointed by each warden and jail administrator, also participated.

The first meeting of the Advisory Committee was held on August 20, 2004, at the Shelby County Training Academy. Its purpose was for the various players to become acquainted with each other and to develop an understanding of how a group approach could benefit the interests of the agencies involved. The most important result of this meeting was the idea of developing a self-administered survey questionnaire for all supervisory/management staff at each of the facilities. The group also decided that the committee would meet monthly.

In the month following the initial meeting, a committee member from the University of Memphis worked to develop the survey. In mid-September, 2004, the “Career Development Survey” was sent to committee chair Chief Coleman, and a preliminary draft was then presented to the entire committee for comment and review. By the end of September, the revised survey instrument was approved for distribution. Administrators distributed the confidential and anonymous surveys along with instructions for completing the forms. Respondents were directed to return the forms directly to the University of Memphis within 2 weeks for review and analysis. A total of 133 corrections supervisors in three county facilities, one state facility, and one federal facility responded on a variety of staff issues including training, equipment, morale, job satisfaction/fulfillment, employment incentives and promotions, and other administrative issues. The results of the survey were compiled, analyzed, and distributed to the Training Advisory Committee members.

Survey Findings and Recommendations
The results from the survey showed that respondents felt they had limited specialized management training and experience. Most felt they were not fully equipped to tackle the complex issues that arise both inside and outside the correctional facility. It is important to note that this finding should not be misconstrued as an isolated criticism, as all corrections departments face these same challenges. Technological innovations in corrections have increased significantly over the past 2 decades. Besides the impacts of these developments, corrections administrators have a very wide array of obligations and job expectations. In some ways, securing inmates may be the easiest part of their job. Balancing the multi-faceted management duties related to training, fiscal administration, human resources, and community relations is a complex assignment and one that requires an ongoing commitment to employee training and development.

Based on the results of the survey, the Advisory Committee produced several recommendations to improve the agencies’ current training strategies to increase opportunities for creating a more qualified staff at all levels.
The survey results showed that most officers felt under-trained to complete the various duties required by their jobs, and many respondents expressed an interest in receiving more targeted training. The Advisory Committee recommended that local correctional agencies and the University of Memphis develop a partnership to create an educational degree program tailored to meet the specific training deficiencies identified by the Career Development Survey. As a result of this recommendation, a sub-committee of the Training Advisory Committee was created to make specific curriculum recommendations.

Based on the survey responses and committee consensus, it was clear that many current administrators would not be interested in pursuing higher education degrees. However, for these “less-ambitious” but valued employees, the committee decided that a certification program could be highly beneficial. The sub-committee was therefore charged with developing a prospectus for two program tracks based on courses offered by the University of Memphis, University College, agency trainings, and the National Institute of Corrections.

Components of each program track are as follows.

- **Certificate Program in Corrections Leadership and Management**—The certificate program is available to employees who would like to receive additional training in corrections leadership and management. All employees are encouraged to become certified, and the involved agencies have agreed to subsidize the tuition costs. Successful completion of the certificate program will be linked to employee promotions. For admission into the certificate program, employees must meet the minimum university requirements and have at least 2 years of relevant corrections experience. In order to receive the Certificate in Corrections Leadership and Management, they must complete the required agency training for employment (non-credit training) and 15 semester hours of specially designed courses. Figure 1 lists the courses included in the certificate program.

- **Bachelor’s of Professional Studies: Correctional Administration**—The Bachelor’s Degree Program in Correctional Administration at the University of Memphis is designed to provide a well-rounded liberal arts education while contributing to the specialized training needs of corrections administrators. The Training Advisory Committee also wanted to develop a bachelor’s degree program that would allow employees to receive cumulative credit for the certificate program and the required basic training provided by each participating agency. The result is a specialized degree program designed especially for corrections professionals. Established through the University College at the University of Memphis.

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**Figure 1. Components of the 15-Hour Certificate Program**
Participants choose one course from each section:

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<tr>
<th>Organization and Administration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice Admin. &amp; Mgmt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization and Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principles of Supervision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<th>Teamwork and Organizational Relations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communication and Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Interactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Behavior in Business</td>
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<td>Labor Relations</td>
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<tr>
<th>Written Communication</th>
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<tr>
<td>Technical/Professional Writing</td>
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<td>Business Communication</td>
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<th>Professional Ethics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ethical Dilemmas in Criminal Justice</td>
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<td>Legal Ethics</td>
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<th>Social and Behavioral Issues</th>
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<td>Racial and Ethnic Minorities</td>
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<td>Sociology of Gender</td>
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<td>Black/White Women in the South</td>
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</table>
University of Memphis, this new inter-disciplinary bachelor’s degree program will allow students to receive a degree in Corrections Leadership and Management. Degree program participants must meet the university’s minimum requirements for admission and have completed the basic training required by each participating agency.

Individuals in the degree program must also have either 2 years of relevant corrections or other criminal justice work experience or a minimum of 30 graded semester hours of credit from an accredited college or university. Employees who already possess a degree in a related field (i.e., criminal justice, law enforcement administration) may substitute this education for the 2 years of experience. The participating agencies will pay for the tuition and fees associated with participation in the degree program as long as the employee maintains a 2.5 grade point average (C-) on all course work. Table 2 shows the specific courses included in the degree program.

Partnering with a local higher education institution offers a number of potential benefits for a corrections agency. Besides allowing current employees to achieve targeted vocational training, having a certification program could be a potential lure for prospective job applicants interested in further developing their skills and competency. In addition, future staff promotions could be linked to the completion of certain certificate tracks. Offering these types of classes to corrections agency employees would likely enhance the confidence with which they perform their duties, and it would have the added benefit of providing motivated employees an incentive to advance their education. Perhaps employees who complete certain tracks could receive academic credit if they decide to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Having a partnership with a local university could not only help supervisors and employees reach their educational and training goals, it could also enhance the public’s perception and respect for the correctional facility.

The Training Advisory sub-committee has been promoting and marketing the bachelor’s degree program to other correctional agencies throughout Tennessee, including the Tennessee Board of Parole and Probation. Members of the Training Advisory Committee also made a presentation to the Tennessee Corrections Association. In May 2005, the new degree program was also promoted during the special events of National Correctional Workers Week hosted by all three correctional jurisdictions. Finally, participants from the Advisory Committee shared the new program at the statewide meeting of Tennessee wardens and the Commissioners of Corrections.

**Figure 2. Components of the Bachelor’s Degree Program**

(No. of courses required in each section)

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<td>Communication in Organizations</td>
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<td>Strategies for Crisis Intervention</td>
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<td>Technical/Professional Writing</td>
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<td>Persuasive Writing</td>
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<td>Business Communication</td>
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<td>Decision Making (choose 2)</td>
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<td>Political Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Statistics</td>
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<td>Research Methods in Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Methods of Social Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Ethics (choose 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethical Dilemmas in Criminal Justice</td>
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<td>Legal Ethics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethics and Professionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban and Public Policy Issues (choose all)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contemporary Social Problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs and Corrections (1 hr.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition from Prison (1 hr.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prison Rape Elimination Act (1 hr.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social and Behavioral Issues (choose 1)</td>
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<td>Interracial Communication</td>
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<td>Racial and Ethnic Minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociology of Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black/White Women in the South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behavioral Issues (choose 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abnormal Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual and Society</td>
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<td>Alcohol, Drugs and Society</td>
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Outcomes of the Training Collaboration

The efforts and vision of the Shelby County Training Advisory Committee have led to an unprecedented level of collaboration in area corrections. The certificate and degree programs offered through the University of Memphis have been developed amazingly quickly, and the program has been widely disseminated throughout the state. Now that the model program has been developed, the sub-committee has begun to explore other educational and training options with other Memphis-area higher education entities, including Southwest Tennessee Community College, Christian Brothers University, and LeMoyne-Owen College.

The benefits of this effort have already extended beyond the original reasons for developing the advisory team. The association between the county, state, and federal corrections entities in Shelby County has allowed the team participants to share ideas and promote cross-agency development. Through the partnership, the three agencies came together during National Corrections Week and held a coordinated Corrections Ball. The three partners also joined forces for a Corrections Agency Olympics event, where teams from the agencies competed against each other in a variety of individual and team athletic events. Finally, the unmatched partnership in Shelby County has improved communication about common training issues, and the benefits are already visible after just a year. Besides developing the Career Development Survey and the resulting Bachelor’s Degree Program in Corrections Leadership and Management, the Training Advisory Committee has also made partners aware of training opportunities available within individual agencies. For example, a recent training event conducted by the National Institute of Corrections for Shelby County corrections employees was also attended by state corrections staff.

Shelby County corrections agencies have joined together to create a cost-effective and innovative approach to addressing shared issues and concerns. Perhaps most important, this partnership is sustainable over time as long as the top administrators continue to participate. The Shelby County Advisory Committee for the Command College came together with a common problem, and through the commitment and innovation of the participants, a fresh, new program has been developed and implemented in less than a year. A similar strategy of collaboration may have comparable benefits in other jurisdictions.

References and Additional Resources


Choices:

A Substance Abuse Recovery Program at the St. Louis County Jail

Choices is a substance abuse recovery program operated in the St. Louis County Jail by staff from the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services (DJS). The program, which began serving clients in August 1998, consists of a 90-day psychoeducational treatment program that incorporates the 12-step recovery program. Choices counselors also provide education and support to family and friends of Choices clients, as well as after-care sessions for clients who have completed Choices and are living in the community. The program is available to 30 male inmates and 15 female inmates at a time, and new groups of clients are accepted four times each year. Judges sentence inmates to the program for 90-day shock incarceration, or clients can participate in the program as a portion of a longer sentence.

At the end of each year of the program, a university professor conducts an evaluation of the program in cooperation with staff from Choices, DJS, and the regional offices of the Missouri State Board of Probation and Parole. Following are selected findings from the evaluation report that ended with Year 7 of the program in August 2005.

Clients Served
Between its inception in August 1998 and August 2005, 1,639 clients were admitted into Choices. The average age of these clients was 32 years. Ages have ranged from 17 to 80 years, with one-third under the age of 25. Nearly one-quarter have been women. Most clients have been Caucasian (52%) or African American (46%), and 2% were of other races. Sixty-three percent (63%) had never been married.

The Choices program serves an at-risk population:

- Most clients have severe substance abuse problems;
Nearly two-thirds have participated unsuccessfully in substance abuse treatment before entering Choices;

More than half of clients have parents or guardians who abused substances;

More than one-quarter of clients have mental health problems in addition to substance abuse problems;

Many clients (36%), particularly women, report a history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse; and

Almost half of Choices clients do not have a high school education or its equivalent.

The most frequent crimes for which clients were admitted to Choices included probation violations (49%), possession of a controlled substance (23%), driving while intoxicated (17%), drug trafficking (15%), stealing (14%), and burglary (10%). Most clients had serious substance abuse problems, with 39% of clients assessed to have a serious alcohol problem and 84% assessed to have a serious drug abuse problem.

Program Evaluation Shows Evidence of Success
Among the 1,588 clients who were discharged from Choices by August 9, 2005, 90% successfully completed the program. Among these 1,435 clients who successfully completed Choices and were released into the community during its first 7 years, 83% were placed on probation. As a part of the annual program evaluation, probation officers are asked to complete follow-up forms with information on clients’ substance use, treatment participation, and success on probation during their first year in the community.

During Program Years 3 through 6, probation officers completed follow-up forms for 456 of the 797 clients (57%) who successfully completed Choices and were released from jail on probation. Among this sample of clients, 71% were required to participate in community-based substance abuse treatment as a condition of probation. Ninety-five percent (95%) of clients who had substance abuse treatment as a condition of probation participated in treatment, compared to only 48% of those who were not required to participate in treatment as a condition of probation. Thus, including treatment as a condition of probation significantly increased the number of clients who participated in a treatment program.

Overall, 81% of the sample of clients who successfully completed Choices and were released on probation participated in one or more types of substance abuse treatment and support services during their first year in the community. Types of programming including outpatient counseling (63%); substance abuse support groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous (53%); other types of support groups (14%); and inpatient treatment (12%).
To measure program success, the Choices evaluation measured three outcomes for clients who successfully completed the Choices program and then were released and placed on probation. The outcomes measured were substance use, success on probation, and arrests.

- **Substance use following release from Choices**—In the sample of 456 clients released on probation, probation officers reported evidence of drug or alcohol use among 50% of the clients during their first year in the community following successful completion of Choices. Overall, marijuana was used by 22% of these clients; cocaine and other stimulants by 21% of clients; alcohol by 14% of clients; heroin and other opiates by 8% of clients; and hallucinogens, depressants, and inhalants by fewer than 1% of clients.

- **Success on probation**—Among clients who successfully completed the program and were released during Year 6, 90% of clients did not have their probation revoked or suspended during their first year in the community. Overall, 83% of clients released during Years 1 through 6 have been successful on probation.

- **Arrests**—Arrests were tallied among clients who successfully completed the program and were released during Program Years 2 through 6. Included were arrests for new criminal acts that occurred within the clients’ first year in the community. Excluded were arrests for probation revocation or suspension for technical violations. Among clients who successfully completed the program and were released during Year 6, 71% of clients were not arrested in their first year in the community. Among those clients who were arrested (28%), 12% were arrested for misdemeanor offenses, 13% for nonviolent felonies, and 5% for violent felonies. The rate of arrest has been consistent over time. Overall, 71% of clients who successfully completed the program and were released during Program Years 2 through 6 were not arrested during their first year in the community.

Not surprisingly, clients who actively participated in some kind of substance abuse treatment were less likely to be arrested during their first year in the community after they successfully completed Choices. For example, among clients who attended substance abuse support groups, 17% were arrested, compared to 58% among clients who did not participate regularly and 33% among clients who were not referred to a group. Sixteen percent (16%) of clients who successfully completed outpatient treatment were arrested, compared to 54% who did not complete outpatient treatment and 27% who were not referred.

These outcomes measuring substance use, success on probation, and arrests suggest that Choices has given inmates the chance to break the cycle and downward spiral of substance abuse and addiction, and many clients have succeeded. In fact, over the course of its first 7 years, Choices has continued to graduate a high percentage of its participants. In Program Year 7, 93% of clients successfully completed the program. Overall, 90% of clients successfully completed the program during its first 7 years.
Another indication of program success is that, when faced with budget cuts, Choices was able to adapt its program by reducing the number of clients it could serve. After this cutback, the program was able to continue serving clients by applying for, and receiving, a federal grant through the Missouri Department of Public Safety. The grant was renewed for a second year during Program Year 7. Even with this grant, however, the program is at less than half of its previous staffing and two-thirds of its previous annual client capacity. The annual capacity of the program was reduced from 300 to 180 inmates.

Client Stories
Following are three stories of men and women who have completed the Choices program. The first two stories were submitted by Choices counselors and the third by the parent of a Choices client.

Patty was born in 1958 and had used heroin since the age of 13. She was in and out of jail over eight times throughout the years. She came to the jail most recently with a life-threatening abscess from shooting drugs and was immediately hospitalized. She completed the Choices Program on July 13, 2001, and she has been clean and sober since then. Patty is currently in her last year at the University of Missouri, St. Louis, and she is the first former inmate to complete a school practicum at Choices. She is now a counselor at a drug rehabilitation center, and she has recently traveled to New York to speak on behalf of reforming criminal drug laws.

Mike entered the Choices Program in October 2002. He had been addicted to alcohol for over 7 years, and he was a very successful businessman, earning over six figures. After his third arrest for Driving While Intoxicated, Mike entered the program sad, angry, and depressed. Mike’s family became involved and met with Mike and the counselors at the jail. After Mike graduated, he attended the Choices Aftercare Program as well as AA meetings. He is now working on his MBA, still attending AA, and has begun to help other struggling addicts.

My son, Brian, was a gifted athlete, and he was fulfilling his dream playing on Wayne Gretzky’s major junior team in Canada. He was ready to sign a contract to play professional hockey when he was seriously injured in a game and his career was suddenly over. I watched in horror as my son’s emotional pain turned to debilitating addiction. When he was sentenced to the Choices Program at the county jail, I blamed myself and thought that they would destroy Brian. The Choices Program has instead enlightened him to realize his potential to not only survive, but to overcome and succeed. Brian’s struggles are not over. He gets scared, but he knows now when to ask for support and where to find the right kind of support. He has a new job and he even works a second job some evenings as a hockey referee. (Imagine that!) Thank you for giving me my son back.
Evaluation Recommendations
Along with its strengths, Choices has faced a range of challenges that required ongoing attention and action. The following recommendations, which were included in the Choices Year 7 evaluation, illustrate some of these challenges.

- **Increase staff training**—Because Choices clients do not have a separate living unit, all staff, including correctional officers, should receive training on substance abuse and its treatment in a jail setting.

- **Continue to monitor client demographics**—Referrals of African American male clients to Choices declined when the program reduced its annual capacity from 300 clients annually to 180. The percentage of African American clients declined from 45% in Year 2 to 23% in Year 7. The sharpest decline has occurred since Choices reorganized to a 90-day program. All parties involved in referring and sentencing clients to Choices should be made aware of this demographic change.

- **Continue to work closely with probation officers**—It is important to work with probation officers, both to ensure continuity of services for clients when they return to the community and to increase officers’ completion of the follow-up surveys needed to evaluate the program.

- **Refer former clients to substance abuse support groups**—Increase the participation of former Choices clients in substance abuse support groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. These groups appear to be an underutilized resource for Choices clients returning to the community. There is no charge for such groups, and they are located throughout the St. Louis metropolitan area. In addition, among the sample of former Choices clients placed on probation, clients who actively participated in these groups were much less likely to use substances, to have their probation revoked or suspended, or to be arrested in the 1-year period after successful completion of Choices. Despite these known positive outcomes, 47% of probationers are not referred to such support groups.

- **Continue to work with clients to increase job and education opportunities**—Continue to provide, and possibly further promote, employment and education opportunities for Choices clients, as engagement in these activities is one of the strongest predictors of community success.

- **Collaborate with additional community-based agencies**—Explore the creation of more relationships with community-based agencies that support the services that Choices provides and can provide services to clients whose needs are beyond the capabilities of Choices.

- **Identify additional funding**—Continue to explore alternative funding sources so the program does not have to rely solely on St. Louis County to operate and can provide services to more people who could benefit from participation in Choices.